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## HOSTILITY AND FEAR IN SOCIAL LIFE\*

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THIS paper will discuss what is commonly termed "race prejudice." Close analysis of the word reveals at least two distinct situations in which it is used: one where irrational antagonism is vented against other people, and the other where rational, that is intelligible, hostility is aroused in defense of a given status or economic order.<sup>1</sup> The events which common speech indicates as "race prejudice" may perhaps better be denoted in other terms.<sup>2</sup> The first necessity will be to examine the conditions under which animals may make hostile responses in social life and to see "race prejudice" in this context. Prejudice reactions cannot be separated from the responses of the organism to its total environment and can only be seen adequately when the nature of the process of socialization is held clearly in mind. We will begin, therefore, with a series of paragraphs indicating the societal context in which aggression is generated and the types of controls placed on hostility by our moral order.

Society is seen here as a group of co-operating animals, producing goods and services and continuing by procreation

within the group.<sup>3</sup> The mode of life of a society is defined by a culture which is for any one generation an arbitrary inheritance of problem solutions.<sup>4</sup> Since aggressive responses of constituent members are a problem to every society, the culture includes patterned ways of dealing with these responses. A society maintains group unity by positive ties between its members based on services mutually rendered, by suppressing in-group appression and by defensive-aggressive operations against other animal groups.<sup>5</sup> Relatively self-contained societies were easier to define in former days when western European techniques of production had not yet tended to bring the whole world into a specialized and interdependent economic unit. It still seems worthwhile, however, to speak of such a thing as an "American society," albeit it is only relatively an independent economic and procreative unit.

Animals are added to a society one by one and trained individually. Social patterns are transmitted by persons who become the targets of positive and negative feeling from the child as the result of facilitating and frustrating behavior on their parts. Each child develops a positive feeling for its own group members and indirectly for all their traits, such as language, smell, appearance and custom. Since renunciations are invariably imposed

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<sup>1</sup>Faris indicates a distinction that is apparently analogous in saying that prejudice attitudes are "impermeable to experience." The same imperviousness is characteristic of irrational aggression. See Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature* (New York, 1937), p. 323.

<sup>2</sup>Dr. A. H. Maslow of Brooklyn College has aided me in clearing up my mind on this score by pointing out the "accretive" nature of the term "race prejudice" and suggesting that, on analysis, it would dissolve into a number of disparate concepts.

<sup>3</sup>W. G. Sumner and A. G. Keller, *The Science of Society* (New Haven, 1932), Vol. I, pp. 6-7.

<sup>4</sup>An excellent illustration of this view is given by Dr. C. S. Ford. See his "A Sample Comparative Analysis of Material Culture" in G. P. Murdock (Ed.), *Studies in the Science of Society* (New Haven, 1937), pp. 225-246.

<sup>5</sup>W. G. Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, 1906), p. 12.

on the incoming animal, it develops also hostile attitudes toward these trainers and toward in-group members and symbols; these attitudes include animosity toward parents and siblings and a negative (as well as positive) feeling tone toward the mores, including religion and authoritarian institutions generally. A correct understanding of this process is indispensable to a proper evaluation of in-group and out-group feeling and hence to related phenomena, such as "race prejudice."

The hostility of an animal toward its in-group is a constant threat to the solidarity of the group and therefore to the continuation of economic cooperation, common defensive operations, and the sharing of a common culture. Such hostility in the individual animal is therefore met with a united hostile front by all other members of the group and is, if necessary, forcibly suppressed. Techniques for accomplishing this suppression range from withdrawal of privilege to a disobedient child to the operations of the criminal law. Supernatural sanctions are frequently invoked, as in the taboo, to inhibit countermores tendencies.

Thus the animal coming into the group (by birth) finds that hostile moves toward in-group members are either hopeless, as in the case of the small child against adults, or dangerous, as in the case of a deserter from an army, and they are for the most part abandoned as overt modes of response. Alexander<sup>6</sup> has correctly said that the control of aggressive behavior is one of the chief problems of social life. Sumner<sup>7</sup> has also perceived the underlying fact of hostility between members of society and expressed it in his

concept of "antagonistic cooperation." Socialization of the child should be conceived of in one aspect as a battle ground between the rejection responses<sup>8</sup> of the child and the demands of the existing moral order into which the child is born. Our child psychology is at present so far unrealistic as drastically to underestimate the strength, character and perseverance of these responses. Common experience as well as my own studies of socialization in two children (unpublished) indicate the frustrating character of the limitations imposed on the naïve and early acquired reaction tendencies of the child, the aggression which arises in the animal as a result of these frustrations and the social opposition to this aggression which is immediately evident. It is in part the underestimation of these tendencies which makes "race prejudice" seem so mysterious. Neither child nor adult individual may be seen as a smoothly compacted group of attitudes, perfectly defined by the traditional social order. Rather each person is a record of a battle; he has a rugged history in which frustration, hostility and fear have all played rôles. There is further, in our social psychology, an underestimation of the frustrating character of in-group life for its adult participants.<sup>9</sup> These frustrations also arouse antagonism against the cherished in-grouper, an antagonism which is not extinguished by the fact that it is not permitted an expression corresponding to its intensity.

Each animal inducted into the social

<sup>8</sup>Sherman's work indicates that aggressive responses in the new-born are a segment of rejection responses to stimuli. See Mandell Sherman, "A Proposed Theory of the Development of Emotional Responses in Infants", *Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 8 (1928), pp. 385-394.

<sup>9</sup>E. S. Bogardus shows awareness of this feature of social life. See his *Immigration and Race Attitudes* (Boston, 1938), pp. 21-22.

<sup>6</sup>Franz Alexander, "Psychoanalysis and Social Disorganization", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XLII, No. 6, p. 806.

<sup>7</sup>*Op. Cit.*, p. 16.

group finally learns to check hostility toward in-groupers either by self-control or repression. It is this fact which gives acculturated animals such a well accommodated "look" to the outside eye, so that the superficial student will hardly suspect the dynamic nature of the history of the animal or the tension created within its personality by the necessity for suppressing aggressive responses. The fact that animals can repress aggression, as well as other tendencies, is one of their most valuable organic capacities from the standpoint of adjustment in society. Individuals unable to perform this task have to be killed as murderers or rapers or isolated as criminals or mental deviants. Repression<sup>10</sup> takes place either through fear of loss of favor of a valuable group member, such as a parent, or through fear of punishment.

Repressed aggressive tendencies are therefore a standard feature of the life of every well socialized animal. In mature animals the aggression is constantly provoked from at least two sources: first, through continuing demands for satisfactions which had to be tabooed in the course of socialization; such (neurotic) wishes are exemplified by the desire incontinently to master all other people who come within one's ken or to gain control of others by exhibiting constant dependence on them and exciting pity. Second, aggression is aroused through rivalry over the securing of desired goals or values such as high status, sex partners, or satisfactions incident to a standard of living. It is these rivalries, of course, which arouse the aggressions noted by Sumner and which fund the antagonism described in his "antagonistic coöperation." The extent of such frustrations is concealed in many people by a sour-

grapes attitude which leads them to affirm grudgingly that they do not want what is actually inaccessible. Deprivation is nevertheless perceived whether it is formally acknowledged or not and from deprivation arise the hostilities toward in-group competitors, hostilities which can never be permitted an expression proportionate to their intensity. As I<sup>11</sup> have elsewhere indicated, it is the under-estimation of these two sources of deprivation and antagonism which makes such phenomena as "race prejudice" seem baffling.

The renunciation of aggressive modes of response to in-groupers is not absolute. Each society standardizes its own permissive patterns and differs from the next in the degree to which hostility may be expressed. In our own society, we are allowed, for example, a limited right to compete for direct goals as by business manipulations, courtship, or sport. We may, also, kill in war-time, defensively, of course; and we have limited rights to derogate others, such as children by adults, women by men, those who cannot get work by those who cannot give it, and some politicians by other politicians. Those who have carried repression too far, by the way, are not able to make use of these opportunities to compete, and they appear as our neurotic persons.

It seems to be a matter of fact that socially permitted aggression is only rarely adequate to drain off the tensions excited by the limiting conditions of socialization in adult life. As a result, in-group members seem to live in a constant readiness for aggressive responses and are set to take advantage of any break in the barrier of social suppression, as for example, when after an economic depression, a

<sup>10</sup>S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (London, 1923), p. 248.

<sup>11</sup>John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (New Haven, 1937), p. 442.

guiltless and helpless President is howled, and aggressively voted, out of public life.

Aggressive responses are apparently powerfully excited by fear. Fear of punishment arouses hostile feelings toward the punishing person and, if strong enough, can lead to direct attack even under circumstances where the response is hopeless as a mode of defense. This is the case of the turning worm and the trapped animal. Intensive studies of individuals have repeatedly demonstrated the existence of the following mechanism: first, wishes to injure other people or the accomplishment of such injury; second, a fear of retaliation based on what has been done or intended; third, the appearance of new aggression against the wronged object. This vicious circle phenomenon is an example of psychological interaction and can lead to apparently reasonless hostile behavior toward those who are guilty only of being the objects of our hostility. The "image" of the ferocious out-grouper, unboundedly hostile toward us, is undoubtedly built up by this process as well as by the reality of damage incurred from such out-groupers.

"Race prejudice" appears as a mixed phenomenon in the context outlined above. It is apparently one of the patterned circumstances under which an animal may kill, injure, exploit, master, scorn, or derogate another animal or group of animals.<sup>12</sup> In examining these

circumstances we will ask ourselves three questions: *What type of aggression* is manifested in a variety of events commonly described by the term? *How is social permission* for aggressive behavior obtained? *How* are these animals or groups of animals *identified* which may be hated with impunity from in-group control?

Under the mixed designation "race prejudice" at least two types of aggressive responses can be indicated. The first is *direct aggression*. Here, the animal or group imposing the frustration and inciting the aggressive response is identified, and the aggressive responses are or can be efficient in controlling the frustrating group. The competition in Southern town for "white man's" jobs is a case in point. Real animosity is manifested against the competing Negro workers, and political and other measures are taken to limit the frustrating competition of such Negroes.<sup>13</sup> Invasion of southern Negroes into northern employment and residence areas, as in East St. Louis and Chicago, has produced similar direct aggressive responses, including riotous attacks.<sup>14</sup> Real competition and frustration lead to real insecurity and out of this insecurity stems the aggression which is designed to restore a balanced situation. Actually in the case of "white man's" jobs, the Negro is pushed out of a "place" which he has formerly occupied and a new and narrower definition of his field of operations is created.

The second type of aggression which appears under the heading "race prejudice" we will call *displaced*. In this case, the inciting cause of the aggressive response is not the object attacked but some in-grouper who can not be attacked because of his value or the danger connected

<sup>12</sup>The presence of aggressive responses in race prejudice has been referred to regularly in one way and another by writers in the field. See, for example, W. I. Thomas, "The Psychology of Race Prejudice", *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, No. 5, pp. 609-11; E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem* (New York, 1927), p. 388; H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations and Classes* (Philadelphia, 1924), pp. 35-37; E. Faris, *op. cit.*, p. 320; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1924), p. 623.

<sup>13</sup>John Dollard, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

<sup>14</sup>Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago* (Chicago, 1922), pp. 1-71.

with fighting him. The aggressive response has been restrained or repressed, and it finds a substitute object. Such aggression seems to be the dynamic component of prejudice where the prejudiced individual has had no contact with the object of derogation. The assumption of displaced aggression seems necessary for the cases indicated by Bogardus and Horowitz<sup>15</sup> where groups who could have had no possible direct reason for it, show animosity. It is Freud's<sup>16</sup> indispensable work on the individual human being in our society which has made the knowledge of this mechanism available.

It appears that in the case of direct aggression there is always some displaced aggression accompanying it and adding additional force to the rational attack.<sup>17</sup> Justifiable aggressive responses seem to break the way for irrational and unjustifiable hostilities. This fact is illustrated in any war and probably accounts for the damnable character of the image of the enemy who is hated, and therefore feared, with disproportionate intensity. The image of the incredibly hostile and amoral outgroup is built up out of our own real antagonism plus our displaced aggression against him; these heightened aggressive responses raise through fear of retaliation the vision of the unbearably hostile enemy.<sup>18</sup>

In the case of repressed aggression, the covert responses which may accompany such aggressive tensions are worth noting.

<sup>15</sup>E. S. Bogardus, *op. cit.*, p. 161; E. L. Horowitz, "The Development of Attitudes Toward the Negro", *Arch. Psychol.* (January 1936), No. 194, pp. 34-35.

<sup>16</sup>*Op. cit.*, p. 220.

<sup>17</sup>Dr. Neal E. Miller of The Institute of Human Relations, Yale University, first impressed this point on me during a discussion and suggested the correlative character of direct and displaced aggression.

<sup>18</sup>See H. D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War* (New York, 1927), pp. 77-101.

In dreams and fantasy, which are mildly expressive acts the sullen in-grouper may reveal his hostilities. Hostile talk in the form of gossip frequently provides a permitted revenge within in-group life. All of these forms of aggression have satisfaction value and tend to reduce aggressive tension even though ever so slightly.<sup>19</sup> When, however, displaced aggression is permitted to over-emphasize an attack which has a reality basis it finds its most easing release. This is the case, for instance, when it is just a Jew and not some other competitor who beats one out in a ticket line, smashes into one's automobile, or is the effective rival in love or status situations. The normal resentment toward an in-grouper is decisively overstressed. Probably also in the case of direct aggression toward an out-grouper, the aggressive response is more fully actualized because of the lack of tender ties and inhibitions toward him. This fact would tend to make prejudice responses more vehement even without the admixture of displaced aggression.

A second factor in our analysis is the problem of how social permission to be aggressive is achieved. We must recall the continuous struggle of the in-group to maintain a unified, coöperative life and to suppress disruptive manifestations of hostility. External taboos are internalized in the form of conscience, and these taboos must be escaped whenever aggressive tendencies are to be indulged. There are two situations which make such expression feasible, and one of them is group rivalry.<sup>20</sup>

When there is an actual threat to the dominance of the in-group, socially legit-

<sup>19</sup>S. Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (New York, 1933), p. 140.

<sup>20</sup>Kimball Young has stressed the factor of economic competition. See his *Social Psychology* (New York, 1930), p. 474.

imated hostilities may appear.<sup>21</sup> This actual threat produces conflict, the interfering or invading group is identified, and the mores ratify defensive measures against the invader. An alternative form of rivalry is the attempt of a sub-group to change its defined status. This maneuver also may call out aggression which will be socially approved. The first case is exemplified by the hostile feelings of California farmers toward Japanese immigrants. "Anyone understands" why this type of conflict should lead to physical reprisals, local measures of limitation, and antagonistic feelings toward Japanese.<sup>22</sup> The attempt of Negroes to change their caste status and participate on equal terms in American life would undoubtedly be greeted by a similar hostility; this phenomenon is most manifest at the present time in the South when the Negroes attempt to claim prerogatives which have not been traditionally assigned to them. Rivalry or conflict occurs, then, over the attempt of an alien or non-privileged group to claim a share in specific goals or values whether they be economic, prestige or sexual. The in-group accepts rivalry manifestations as legitimate modes of keeping the outsider in his place and of maintaining the undiluted superiority of the prior occupants. In the case of group rivalry, we may note that the object drawing hostility is clearly identified and that this process is one of social conflict.<sup>23</sup> Such conflict processes appear to validate aggressive expression on the part of individuals otherwise bound.

<sup>21</sup> Brown has a creative discussion of "habitat dominance" which should be related to Sumner's conception of the in-group. See Fred Brown, "A Sociopsychological Analysis of Race Prejudice", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 27, 1932-33, pp. 365-7.

<sup>22</sup> J. F. Steiner, *The Japanese Invasion* (Chicago, 1917), pp. 68-92.

<sup>23</sup> R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *op. cit.*, Ch. IX, pp. 574-662.

Sheer traditional patterning, without active group rivalry, may also denote a despised group and permit unfriendly manifestations toward its members. This is the case where people are anti-Semitic who have never known any Jews or who "would not like to associate with Negroes," while having no direct conception of what such association would mean. Such traditional patterning in reference to Negroes may be brought about through books which young children read which present "Little Black Sambo" in a ridiculous light, or through characters in radio sketches which show the Negro as a clown or a superstitious coward. The same thing may happen with reference to Jews, even by terms in common speech, as when people say "I tried to jew him down." Such experiences accumulate into patterned conceptions of Negroes and Jews and seem to offer these figures to living individuals as suitable objects of scorn and targets of hostility. The pattern itself is inherited socially and constitutes a break in the dikes built against individual aggressiveness. Such images of Jews and Negroes are created in a way similar to the "out-group image" that has been discussed earlier, although they are, of course, less highly charged. In the case of current German stereotypes, the image of the Jew, however, closely approximates that of the perennial out-grouper, as the *Steuermer* cartoons of Jews show. We must realize, nevertheless, that these experiences with "social patterns" are actual experiences, even though they do not involve direct contact with the object of the prejudice. We can say only that they do seem to permit hostility to be mobilized against certain groups of people. It is probably also true that inherited patterns are records of ancient rivalries and exist as the detritus of former group conflicts. In the case of current American antagonism against the image

of the "Turk," one has no difficulty in surmising that the historical conflicts between Mohammedanism and Christianity have given rise to this image, and that the threatening conception of the Turk has been still more recently reinforced by the war-time propaganda against Turkey.

Either rivalry or traditional patterning creates a stereotyped image<sup>24</sup> in the minds of current members of society of a class of individuals who may be more or less painlessly detested. These images usually denote men who are to some degree released from the moral order which binds us and who are feared because "anything" may be expected of them; because they do not accept our mores, they are also regarded as inhuman beings to whom "anything" may be done. It is an effect of this stereotyping to produce the categorical treatment which is given those against whom prejudice is felt; individual discriminations tend to drop out and the differential treatment accorded to in-groupers is omitted. Within our own group we judge people according to their deserts and not according to standard classifications, but not so with the group against whom prejudiced stereotypes exist.

Our third consideration inquires into the means of identifying the object of "race prejudice."<sup>25</sup> It is highly important to be able to tell an out-grouper on sight so that one may not fall into the error of treating an in-group member with unseemly aggression. In-group taboos must be preserved and hence stigmata must be found which clearly designate those-to-be-hated-with-impunity. The pariah must give his warning cry if the Brahman is to preserve his purity from debasing contact. It has been widely

noted that aggression may follow various lines of physical and cultural demarcation. Some of these, I hope the most important, will be indicated here. Among the most secure marks or signs which will expose a group to prejudice demarcations are race marks. These are physical stigmata such as hair form, skin color, eye fold, lip form, and the like. They are easy to identify and offer less possibility of confusing in-group and out-group members. Prejudice reactions based on these signs can be maintained for long periods of time, since it is simple to keep the out-group at arms length by prohibiting sex contact or defining mixed bloods as belonging to the outcast group. Frequently also a language, family structure, religion, standard of living, and work habits accompany these physical stigmata and make clear the reason for rivalry, as in the case of the Japanese in California. Since inter-marriage tends to introduce such out-groupers into the circle of family relations and therefore into in-group contact, it is necessary to forbid marriage or sex contact if dominance is to be maintained by the superior group. Around the question of sex contact with "racial inferiors" center also rivalries and hostilities which are displaced from the in-group field.

Nations are also social units in terms of which hostile reactions can be expressed. Aggression seems to flow toward the borders of a nation with special readiness. It would seem that this group is the in-group which is especially designated by Sumner's use of the term. The word "nation" also corresponds closely with our use of the term "society" as a more or less self-contained, procreative group often symbolized in our day and age by tariff walls, passports, and the use of a common form of money. Franco-German rivalry has been in recent times a common symbol of such national rivalry, and there seems a special predisposition in these two

<sup>24</sup> Faris discusses this collective image. *Op. cit.*, p. 321.

<sup>25</sup> This factor is vigorously indicated by Donald Young under the term "visibility". See his *American Minority Peoples* (New York, 1932), p. 588.

groups (based on repeated conflict) to view one another as potential frustrators and to "hate" the enemy accordingly. Both real rivalry resulting from expected attack and displaced aggression serve to vitalize the evil image of the other nation. Language, membership in another state, and various traditional beliefs and aspirations identify the out-grouper. It should be noted that these marks, as compared with race marks, are transitory although they are exceedingly durable if viewed from any short-time perspective.

Nationality serves to distinguish still a further kind of out-group. This is the case where we have a differentiated member group existing in a nation, as just defined. The Irish in Britain, the Poles in old Russia, or the Jews in modern Germany meet these stipulations. Such groups are often marked out by language, sometimes by religion, sometimes by peculiarities of custom or costume, and usually by divergent group memories and aspirations. Hostilities flow across nationality lines also—both in the scorn, derogation and limitation of competition by the superior group and in the resentment and self-affirmation of the minorities. If we call the Jews "Kikes," they also have a derogatory name for us, i.e. *Goyim*. If there is the pressure in our society to exclude Jews from recognition and appropriate social reward, they are, perforce, banded into a minority in which the members render mutual assistance to one another. This latter manifestation shocks many persons who do not need the pattern of anti-Semitism, or who need it only a little as a means of expressing their aggression, and such short-sighted individuals may come to believe that this in-group feeling among Jews is the cause and not a result of the antagonistic feeling against them.

Caste stratification is a form of social

grouping along which prejudice reactions also form. I cannot agree with other workers<sup>26</sup> who think of the possibility of a caste system so firmly stabilized that no aggressive manifestations are needed to sustain it. What has been correctly analyzed seems to be that high, overt, physical aggression is not needed to maintain caste relations, but if contempt, loathing, scorn, and patronizing attitude are included as manifestations of hostility, I believe we must consider that caste permits of systematic resentment at least toward lower caste groups by their masters. Caste marks may include specialization of work, barriers to legitimate sexual congress, or unalterable lower status accompanied by a degree of social isolation. Sometimes race signs accompany caste, as in the Negro caste in America and to a certain degree the Hindu caste system, i.e. the lighter the color the higher in general the caste.<sup>27</sup> In Hindu caste, also, arbitrary physical signs accompany high caste membership, i.e. the marks on the Brahman forehead.

Class marks too are forms of differentiation around which group hostilities may cluster. Such marks include standard of living, education, occupation, absence or presence of tendencies toward social mobility, location of residence, absence or presence of capital in large or small amounts, influence of distinguished ancestry and family, and the like. These factors can divide people crudely into class divisions. Stereotyped beliefs often exist as to members of other classes than one's own. For instance, middle-class and lower-class people sometimes believe that all upper-class people hold their position by virtue of superior competitive

<sup>26</sup> Park and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 623-4; Faris, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

<sup>27</sup> Personally communicated by Dr. K. T. Behanen of The Institute of Human Relations, Yale University.

achievement, that upper-class people are happy and free of anxiety, since money brings these values, or that upper-class people are generally wasteful and not worth their social salt. The latter belief, for example, would tend to increase class antagonism and to direct both rational and displaced hostility toward upper-class people. Upper-class individuals, on the other hand, may come to believe that unemployed lower-class people do not want to work, that they are lazy, that they are on relief because they have refused to save their money, or that they are a poor biological stock which has been defeated in the race for social preëminence. The latter belief, for instance, would justify severe measures toward unemployed lower-class people such as those initiated in New Jersey last year when State relief was abruptly abandoned, certainly a hostile maneuver based on an incorrect perception of the realities of life for the unemployed. Class antagonism seems to be intrinsic to our society through the necessity of competing for an arbitrarily limited social income. Possibly such antagonisms are inevitable between the leaders and the led in any society; they will certainly be greater the tighter is the economy and the greater is the competition for income and status. Along class lines both direct and displaced aggression may flow; those who picture our industrial leaders as monsters of greed and selfishness are undoubtedly creating a stereotyped image which is engorged with displaced aggression, in addition to the direct aggression earned by their failure to lead our economy along more productive ways.

Slave marks also indicate a group differentiation which invites aggressive expression. These signs include an absence of "rights" on the part of the slaves, that is, of equivalence before the mores. Slaves have a categorical low status, can,

like lower-caste members, be arbitrarily and aggressively treated, can be compelled to work, can be limited from intermarriage with the dominant group and may receive a small share of social rewards and status for their work. Race marks often accompany slave status, as in the case of our American Negro slaves, and occasionally class marks, such as relegation to menial occupations. Aggression on the part of slaves which would tend to change their status is vigorously combatted and exists under constant threat of suppression should it appear.

The physical and group differentiations just cited permit both rational and irrational aggression to be manifested; only in some cases can these manifestations be properly known as "race prejudice." "Race prejudice" seems, then, but a footnote to the wider consideration of the circumstances under which aggression may be expressed within a society. We will now turn to a series of concrete situations and use our analysis of the conditions of social hostility to study these situations.

## I

First to be examined will be the case of the employing group in Little Steel against the Steel Workers' Organizing Committee of the C.I.O. The direct aggression mobilized in this conflict was undoubtedly high and expressed by the employees in striking, picketing, denunciations of their opponents, attempts to prevent strike-breakers from entering a plant, and the use of the "Sit-Down." Employers, in turn, engaged in attempts to evict "Sit-down" strikers, denunciations of strike leaders and techniques, arousal of public sentiment against the strikers, injunctions against "Sit-Downers," the use of professional strike-breakers, and, in some cases, the invocation of aid from the State

with its troops and police to break up picketing. Forces were occasionally joined in riotous manifestations where physical fighting broke out. Undoubtedly irrational aggression was present on both sides. Those who refer to Lewis and other labor leaders as "Reds" are plainly venting irrational hostility on them; on the other hand, "the bosses" and "economic royalists" are decidedly partisan definitions of the hard-pressed employers and plant managers who have to "make profits" or get out.

The aggressive expressions already referred to are obviously not manifested because of social tradition but, on the contrary, as a result of inevitable rivalries between class groups in our society. Aggressions by the laboring group were undoubtedly mobilized due to insecurity states caused by past unemployment and wage cuts.

Identification takes place by means of class marks. The status of employer, manager, or minor administrative personnel identified one group; that of organized worker with his Union card, slogans and views identified the other.

## II

The Jews in America present a contrasting picture falling within the bounds of what is commonly called "race prejudice." Toward Jews both direct and displaced aggression is expressed. That there is displaced aggression is proved by the increased resentment which is felt when any affront is dealt out by a Jew. The nudge which would remind another passenger on a subway that he is stepping on one's foot may become a push if the offender is a Jew. The difference between the nudge and the push measures the increased hostility that may be expressed toward Jews.

Both ordinary rivalry and permissive

tradition conspire to bring about hostile reactions toward Jews. In the first place, Jews compete in all three of our class groups and their competition is keenly felt; special skills acquired in the course of their severe competition for existence in western European society have made them particularly apt at the tasks of an interdependent and specialized economic organization. As traders, bankers, professionals, and intellectual people they are able to be very effective rivals for posts of highest skill, income and distinction. Because of their chronic marginal status in western European society, they have also become exceptionally mobile, feeling that only the highest posts and positions of control will give them even a minimum of security. They have been willing, therefore, by and large to make exceptional sacrifices to achieve preëminence, and these sacrifices are the measure of their special effectiveness as rivals. There is also, of course, the permissive tradition for anti-Semitism based on religious grounds. The animosity represented in anti-Semitism is keenly felt in such terms as "Kike" and "Sheeny," and it is not impossible that the term "Christ-killer" may become more familiar to us in this generation than it has been in recent times. It would seem that a rise in anti-Semitism in America is likely because of a steadily shrinking opportunity to earn a living for great numbers of non-Jewish Americans. If the Negroes do not suffice to provide a scape-goat for irrational antagonism, as they have so often in times past, the turn of the Jews may come. It is possible, of course, that a war or series of wars may avert this situation and direct toward an out-group image both the rational and the displaced aggression which is rising against those who seem to be responsible for current straitened conditions of life.

The Jews have maintained to some degree a physical type and are sometimes identifiable by racial signs. However, more common stigmata are those of language and religion. As already noted, Jews often identify themselves by in-group loyalties when they are not especially designated as objects of prejudice.

### III

Quite a different problem is presented by the case of American Negro slaves of older time. We have already noted that Park believed race prejudice to be virtually non-existent under the slave system. In terms of our concepts we would conclude that there was some, although a minimum of physical coercion. The slaves were actually controlled in part by a policing organization which made certain that they did not leave their owners or foregather for anti-social agitation. Even if the whipping of slaves was exceedingly rare, as was apparently the case, there was always the threat of physical punishment in the back-ground, and the possibility even of death for the anti-social Negro. Whether or not we may say that there was "race prejudice" there certainly was some measure of direct aggression applied to the slaves. Displaced aggression seems also to have been present although again in a low degree. There was the humiliating name "nigger," some derogation through obvious patronage and stressing of absolute superiority on the part of whites and in addition, frequently, the attribution of inhuman or brutish qualities to the slaves. These more subtle items must still be judged as aggression since they tended to damage the self-esteem of individual Negroes and to make Negroes seem in a class apart from the order of human beings. Even the occasional favorable comparison of Negroes with lower-class whites only stressed the

implication of white superiority, since it was found so surprising that an individual Negro could turn out to be more acceptable than a white man. We should note here that the slave order is accompanied by a high degree of positive rapport based, of course, on the absolute submission and dependence of Negroes. Affection on the part of the white man necessarily went out to the serviceable, loyal, and self-sacrificing Negro whose works were so great and demands so little. Under these circumstances a minimum of force served to keep the status terraces intact.

Such hostility as existed toward Negroes of course was permitted and ratified by the traditional social order. It was occasionally incited directly by slave revolts, but these were sufficiently infrequent and ineffectual not to play a great rôle. The threat of status change in the future may be seen as a form of anticipated rivalry which justified the policing and punishing techniques employed. The whole state of affairs, on the basis of which social permission for slavery and aggression toward and derogation of slaves existed, was handed down from a state of group conflict and may be seen as a feature of rivalry between western European and African societies. Here as elsewhere "social permission" is the resultant of actual conflict in the past.

The Negro was, of course, identified by his race marks as well as status marks. Among the latter would be habituation to menial work, imperfect acquisition of American language, morals and customs, and psychological attitudes characteristic of a servile group.

### IV

A final case will be that of a group of Germans who invaded a small American industrial town in the early twentieth

century. Local whites largely drawn from the surrounding farms manifested considerable direct aggression toward the newcomers. Scornful and derogatory opinions were expressed about these Germans, and the native whites had a satisfying sense of superiority toward them. They were viewed as strangers and their actions suspiciously observed. There was also undoubtedly some displaced hostility. Some of the dissatisfactions which were experienced with the employment system in the town no doubt issued in aggression which was displaced on the foreigners.

The chief element in the permission to be aggressive against the Germans was rivalry for jobs and status in the local woodenware plants. The native whites felt definitely crowded for their jobs by the entering German groups and in case of bad times had a chance to blame the Germans who by their presence provided more competitors for the scarcer jobs. There seemed to be no traditional pattern of prejudice against Germans unless the skeletal suspicion of all out-groupers (always present) be invoked in this place.

The Germans, of course, were clearly recognizable by their nationality marks. They spoke German and attended German Catholic churches: they lived in a single region of the town at first and were more or less isolated from the native Americans, and their language was thought to be funny and was frequently parodied by the English-speaking adults and children in the town. Some of their food preferences such as their sour krout and sausage, were objects of ridicule.

Such marks of identification are transitory as compared with race marks, for instance, but they still do tend to be maintained by the consolidating influence of

the language group; singing and athletic societies in this little town testify to this day to the presence of a German cultural stream in the area.

In a previous discussion of "race prejudice" I<sup>28</sup> have offered a theory somewhat similar to the one above except that in the first case I was able to see only the irrational or displaced aggressive components of the reaction. Criticism from other students<sup>29</sup> has compelled me to see the rôle of actual rivalry in prejudice reactions and to attempt to do it more justice.

At the end, we might ask how such a theory of the rôle of hostility and fear in social life can be tested. One might indicate the following ways: first, "common experience" which we have by virtue of the fact that we are participating in a society, are a part of its interactive mechanism and ourselves have felt the surges of affect which are here described. In case reference is made to such experience, however, the events must be specifically recorded. Second, special studies already made in the field are of great aid. Horowitz' work as well as the observations of Bogardus indicate that no mere rational theory of aggressive responses will serve our purpose. Third, the best source of confirmation must inevitably be the detailed, recorded life history, for it is only with the aid of such documents that one can judge disproportionate aggression accurately and distinguish sharply between direct and displaced hostility. The latter studies await a generation of social psychologists better trained and more patient than our own.

<sup>28</sup>*Op. cit.*, pp. 439-444.

<sup>29</sup>Dr. R. V. Bowers of the University of Rochester has protested most effectively on this score.